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There has been considerable legislative development in the UK and other jurisdictions 
around the protection of the victims of “Revenge Pornography”. While both England and 
Wales (section 33 of the Serious Crime and Courts Bill 2015) and Scotland (section 2(1) 
of the Abusive Behaviour and Sexual Harm (Scotland) Act 2016) legislation have already 
shown a significant response in the courts1,  this remain a last resort and potentially costly 
way of resolution for victims. The Crown Prosecution Service guidance2 suggests that 
court proceedings will only be pursued by the state if there is clear evidence of intent to 
cause distress and the person in the image has not consented to the image being shared. 
While the current issues around sentencing and issues with the legislation lie outside of 
the scope of this article, the fact that intent to cause distress is so clearly defined by the 
CPS, we can see there will may discrepancies between what we might argue to be 
revenge pornography and that which can be tried in a courtroom. As is typical with any 
social problem facilitated by technology, legislation, with its precise definitions and case 
based interpretations, can only go so far to protect victims of harm.  
 
Service Providers Need to “Do More” 
As such, there remains pressure on social media companies to “do more” to protect 
victims of harm that arises from the non-consensual sharing of indecent images in a more 
pro-active manner. There have been calls3 to ensure that this media is not posted in the 
first place or to automate the take down process so that victims do not have to experience 
repeated discoveries of the shared images and make numerous take down reports. There 
is certainly evidence, from organisations such the Revenge Pornography Helpline4, that 
social media companies are far more responsive to take down requests than they have 
been historically. However, there is still a requirement for a report to take down the image 
before an investigation is mounted and only then, in the event that “community standards” 
have been breached, the media will be removed.  
 
There have been calls for technology that might algorithmically determine whether an 
image is indecent, or a post contains jihadist materials. The algorithm could then prevent 
its posting, often through the application of fabled artificial intelligence solutions called for 
by UK politicians such as Amber Rudd5. However, some providers have declared such 
automated solutions are still a way off6. There seems little surprise that this is the case – 







while artificial intelligence is currently being extolled for solutions for everything from self-
driving cars to determining whether a post on social media reflects the mental health of 
the poster, these techniques generally rely on pattern matching and classification within 
large scale data processing. Algorithms are “trained” by controlled data so it can “learn” 
similarity and hopefully lead to matching when shown a different but similar piece of data. 
Therefore, theoretically, an algorithm fed with a training set of indecent images would 
identify others with similarities in their data composition. However, given the complexities 
in law of determining whether an image or video is indecent it seems a high and unrealistic 
expectation to do this algorithmically – how could a training set ever be sufficiently large 
but still consistent in data composition to encompass everything that might be considered 
indecent in law? How large would such a set need to be? Who decided that the data set 
represents indecency in the legal sense of the term? 
 
More Realistic Expectations on Service Provider Responsibly  
Therefore, we might have some sympathy with platform providers in the never-ending 
policy makers quest to make them “do more”, particularly if they are being asked to do 
things that are technically extremely difficult in a live, large-scale operation platform. 
However, there are things that platform providers can do, in the event an image has 
already been reported and taken down, given it would have therefore been interpreted by 
the provider as not having met community standards. In an ongoing case in Belfast a girl 
who, at the age of 14, had indecent self-generated images shared on Facebook and taken 
down following her reporting them, discovered that they had been shared again7. The 
girl’s legal team argued that Facebook had responsibility to prevent the reposting of 
images already taken down and that the technology to do this is far less complex than 
mythical “indecency detection” algorithms – a data processing technique called file 
hashing8.  
 
Hashing is a method used in many computer based applications to verify the validity of 
data. It is a mathematical technique that takes data in its requisite form (for example a 
file, a communication, elements within a structured database) and through the application 
of an algorithm, processes this data into a unique alphanumeric string. The algorithms 
are developed to produce a unique value for any given data artefact, and are very reliable 
ways to compare the validity of data, or whether two data artefacts are identical in 
composition. For example, in a scenario where a file might be communicated between 
two devices, a “hash” of the file prior to transmission, and the subsequent hash of the file 
at the receiving end, allows the data communications protocol to check whether it has 
remained intact during transmission. In the case of image checking the hash is generated 
and stored for a given image and, if that image is posted again, the hashing algorithm will 
generate the same unique alphanumeric string, and the platform will know the image has 
been shared before.  
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This is the central argument in the Belfast case – the indecent images of the girl had 
already been posted on Facebook and then taken down. Why, argue the legal team, could 
the service provider not hash any image that has been taken down so if someone tries to 
repost, the system will detect this and prevent posting? Since this case has moved to a 
full hearing, Facebook have announced a project in the US that will do what has been 
called for in the case for extremist content, but not indecent, non-consensually shared 
indecent photographs9.   
 
At the start of November 2017, Facebook, along with the Australian eSafety Commission, 
announce a pilot project that would add another level of proactivity to addressing revenge 
pornography concerns10. The proposed pilot system, initially solely in Australia, provides 
the facilities for users to share their self-generated indecent images with Facebook and 
use hashing techniques to ensure that further reposting is not possible. The basic steps 
of the proposed system are: 
 
• Australians can complete an online form on the eSafety Commissioner’s official 
website. 
• To establish which image is of concern, people will be asked to send the image to 
themselves on Messenger. 
• The eSafety Commissioner’s office notifies us of the submission (via their form). 
However, they do not have access to the actual image. 
• Once we receive this notification, a specially trained representative from our 
Community Operations team reviews and hashes the image, which creates a 
human-unreadable, numerical fingerprint of it. 
 
Facebook stress that the image is not retained for any longer that it takes to evaluate and 
hash the image, the only thing that is stored long term is the hash itelf. As a final step in 
the process once the hash is complete and stored, the sender of the image is informed 
so they can remove the image from Messenger, and at that point Facebook will remove 
the image from their database.  
 
Therefore, if there is a case of someone else trying to share that image on Facebook, 
when that image is hashed and compared against the user uploaded indecent image 
hashes, there will be a match, the image will not be posted and the intended poster will 
be informed their upload infringes community standards. In that way, the approach 
“protects” the person in the image from exposure by others.  
 
Throwing Tech at Social Problems 
While this is an interesting concept, and does show how existing proven technology can 
be used to provide an element of protection for those wishing to protect themselves from 
risk of exposure, it does also demonstrate how, if left to service providers, their only route 
to protection is technological (unless such a platform employs human intervention prior 
to anything being uploaded, which is possibly exorbitantly resource intensive). This 
                                                 
9 https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2016/12/partnering-to-help-curb-spread-of-online-terrorist-content/ 
10 https://newsroom.fb.com/news/h/non-consensual-intimate-image-pilot-the-facts/ 
subsequently does not provide a complete solution while once again demonstrating 
Ranum’s Law11 – “You can’t solve social problems with software.” 
 
We can reflect upon a few potential issues with this approach, by way of illustration of this 
point. Firstly, a fundamental issue lies in the age of the poster of images. We are fully 
aware that teen “sexting” is a complex and challenging issue for a lot of young people12 
and there is a high likelihood that images shared by young people among their peers may 
end up being posted on social media. Therefore, one can realistically assume that young 
people might view the proposed approach by Facebook as one that could be used to 
ensure they are protected from the risk of spreading images of themselves. Of course, 
this poses a serious problem to the “solution” provider – if young people are sharing self-
generated images with Facebook, the provider is, in essence, facilitating the distribution 
of indecent images of minors. The subsequent storing of these images further breaks 
child protection laws – the duration of storage is not something defined in the covering 
statutes, it is any storage of indecent images of minors that defines the criminality.  
 
While the provider might argue that, given there is a vetting process which will check the 
profile of the user who is uploading the images, they verify age via the profile, much has 
been written about the struggle all social media providers face with age verification on 
their systems. There are many “under aged” users on these social media platforms, and 
the means by which most social media providers verify age (asking at sign up for a date 
of birth) is hardly rigorous. And while a provider might argue that any user lying about 
their age on sign up is invalidating the terms and conditions of use and therefore their 
right to protection, it would be a very brave defence in the event of providing a “solution” 
to revenge pornography that potentially encourages the distribution of indecent images 
of minors.  
 
We then move into the perennial legal and moral debate around who determines the 
indecency of the image and makes the judgement on whether it should be hashed and 
stored. While Facebook has stated that “a specially trained representative from our 
Community Operations team reviews and hashes the image”, the review process itself is 
not defined, nor are the thresholds for indecency. What would be the situation where a 
user flagged an image for hashing they believed was placing them at risk, but the reviewer 
decided that the image was not indecent “enough” to be hashed. Who makes the decision 
on decency? The image owner, or the platform provider? We know from our own work 
that there are cultural differences around indecency – for example, a western perspective 
on indecency might be different from one from an Asian one. While nudity might be a 
threshold for some, cleavage might be sufficient in another. And while legal indecency 
may not be met, the impact on the victim in the event of the sharing of such images may 
still equally severe.  
 
Following on from this, the owner of the image also raises some concerns – for example, 
if we are to state that the image has to be self-generated in order for Facebook to be able 
to hash the image and store it, can we assume that indecent images of individuals taken, 
                                                 
11 https://utcc.utoronto.ca/~cks/space/blog/tech/SocialProblemsAndTechnicalDecisions 
12 Phippen, A. (2017). “Children's Online Behaviour and Safety: Policy and Rights Challenges”. Palgrave, UK. 
for example, by a partner are not covered? What would happen then if a vexatious ex-
partner, with a collection of images they had taken of the victim, decided to share those 
images on the platform? We must assume that this protection mechanism would not be 
open to the victim in this scenario, because copyright for the image lies with the taker of 
the image, not the subject in the image (as defined in the Copyright, Designs and Patents 
Act 1988) as long as the subject consented, at the time, to the image being taken. In 
essence, this protection will only work for “selfies”. Once potential abusers are aware of 
this, their approach to abuse will simply switch to sharing images for which they retain 
copyright.  
 
There are also issues with hashing itself – given the aim of a hashing algorithm is to 
produce a unique hash based upon the whole of the data within an image, any 
modification to the source image will produce a different hash, even if this alteration is a 
single pixel. While Microsoft’s PhotoDNA (the proposed hashing technology in the 
Facebook trial) has some built in resilience to this, such as resizing or recolouring13, it will 
still produce a different hash if the image is cropped or edited in a more complex way. 
Therefore, if a potential abuser is sufficiently aware of this “protection mechanism”, it is 
very easy to bypass by creating a new image that is perhaps a crop of the original image. 
While hashing is a very good way of comparing an exact copy of an image, it will be far 
less successful if such images are modified in some way.  
 
Responsibility for Protection vs Going After the Abusers 
Even in this brief review of the issues, from a legislative and technical perspective we can 
see that the “solution” is not without significant problems. And while we should applaud 
efforts by service providers to think about how technology can be used to help victims, 
we can also see that technology is always going to struggle to find solutions within 
complex social systems. In essence, the pressure on service providers to “do more” is 
resulting in surrogates implemented in code rather than addressing the issues with a 
multi-stakeholder approach drawn from effective social policy. However, the more 
fundamental issue around this “solution” that lies at the heart of victim blaming within 
sexting and revenge pornography scenarios – responsibility.  
 
In our own work with RP victims, both adults and minors, what is clear is that they will 
often blame themselves for the redistribution of the image. Many victims will state that by 
taking the image they placed themselves at risk, and it was therefore their fault their 
abuser had the image to share or use for further harassment. With our work in sexting, 
recent research presented at the Australian eSafety Commissioner’s Conference in 
November 201714 over 70% of young people surveyed (n=700) say the responsibility of 
the image lies with the maker (and usually subject) of the image.  
 
By communicating to the population that the way to protect yourself from the dangers of 
abuse from revenge pornography is to share the image with a third party who will put in 
measures to protect you, surely one is saying the responsibility for the control and 
management of the image lies with victim? There are two messages this given out by 
                                                 
13 https://news.microsoft.com/features/microsofts-photodna-protecting-children-and-businesses-in-the-cloud/ 
14 ttps://www.esafety.gov.au/on-the-edge-17 
this. Firstly, the provider is saying “we have provided you with a means to protect yourself 
from someone else sharing images you might have taken of yourself on our platform. if 
you don’t engage with this solution, it will be your fault if someone posts it on our platform”. 
However, perhaps the more confusing message is that “if you want to protect yourself 
from someone sharing images of you, you need to firstly share the image with someone 
else. But don’t worry, we can be trusted. But don’t share with anyone else, because they 
can’t be, unless you share with us first!”. These messages are surely just further ways of 
showing the victim that responsibility for the non-consensual sharing of an image lies with 
them, unless they do something further to protect themselves. This harks back to the sort 
of messages young people talk about when they raise the non-consensual sharing of 
images with adults supposedly responsible for their safeguarding – “well, you shouldn’t 
have done that should you!?”.   
 
Surely the focus of control, and technical intervention, should lie with ensuring that others 
cannot non-consensually share indecent images of others and, if they do there will be 
consequences for doing so. This should be implemented in line with more effective public 
communication, legislation, and stronger sentencing of those who chose to share images 
of other without consent. We fear that this “solution” just places more pressure on the 
victim to ensure they protect themselves and the responsibility for protection lies with 
them.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
